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This thesis examines the factors that affected Army and Air Force
spending for fiscal years 1955-1984. The four major appropriation
categories were analyzed using budget shares, growth rates, and per-
centages of the respective services' budget totals. The data was then
compared to DON and DOD spending trends to determine if consis-
tent budget behavior exists within DOD. The result was that DOA and
DOAF budgeting appears to be incremental in nature, with program-
matic influences on new and controversial issues. Availability of DOD
funds influenced the categorical spending for each of the services but
in different ways. While DON followed the DOD pattern closely. DOA
and DOAF budget emphasis reflected the nature of the individual ser-
vice, which explains why Military Personnel received the largest DOA
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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, it seems that defense spending receives greater visi-
bility than any other portion of the federal budget. This is partly a
question of size and partly due to attempts to answer the question of
how much defense is enough. Historically, Congress has not always
been as generous with the Department of Defense as it has during the
first years of the Reagan presidency. The DOD budget is affected by
complex environmental and political influences. Deciding how much
is enough is particularly difficult to do in peacetime. This thesis
traces defense spending patterns to show how the budget has varied
over time.
How defense spending fluctuates is subject to debate among
analysts. Some argue that defense spending is incremental in nature.
This means that small aspects of the budget receive relatively small
changes to their established "base" from year to year. The opposing
point of view holds that recent defense budgeting is the result of
special interests in programs which may receive larger increases than
other programs. A compromise between these two schools of thought
would reflect the budget as incremental in nature, with new and con-
troversial programs falling into a programmatic scheme. This thesis
analyzes the incremental and programmatic nature of defense spend-
ing patterns.
Anderson's thesis [Ref. 11 analyzed DOD's four largest spending
categories from 1955 to 1984. He determined that the availability of
funds to DOD affected the different categories differently. Using each
category's budget share, growth rates, and percentages of the annual
DOD increment. Anderson concluded that the Executive budget
included non-incremental adjustments, primarily in the areas of
RDT&E (research, development, testing, and evaluation) and pro-
curement. He further concluded that, of the categories studied.
RDT&E had the most consistent success in competing for funds.
Benson's thesis [Ref. 2] used Anderson's approach in analyzing the
Department of the Navy. Benson analyzed the four major appropriation
categories within DON over the same 30-year period as Anderson. She
concluded that the DON trends were similar to the DOD trends.
Procurement in the Navy was the most sensitive to the availability of
funds, while RDT&E receives its largest shares of the budget during
"abundant" funding years.
One other work of note is a thesis by Danny A. Shockley [Ref. 3].
He analyzed DOD budget trends relative to the wealth of the nation
(GNP) on the whole. Although this approach is not used in this
evaluation of the Army and Air Force, it provides some answers to fur-
ther defense budget questions.
This thesis extends the work done at the DOD and DON levels.
The research question for this thesis is: Do all three services show
similar trends over the 30-year period covered, or do the individual
services offset so that the DOD average is not representative of any one
service?
10
The next chapter will discuss the background for the study.
Succeeding chapters will analyze a 30-year period of spending by the
Departments of the Army and Air force. The final area of discussion
will compare budget trend results of each service department, and
how these trends fit into the aggregate DOD model of categorical
spending.
The primary source for the budget data used in this thesis is from
The Budget of the United States Government [Ref. 4] for fiscal years
1955 through 1986. Although the analysis only covers from 1955 to
1984. the 1985 and 1986 books were used for actual outlays in 1983
and 1984. GNP deflators used in 1972 constant dollar conversions




The defense establishment is invariably described as the servant
of foreign policy." [Ref. 6] With this in mind, and realizing that
defense spending accounts for the largest single agency portion of the
federal budget, it is no wonder that it is held up to close financial
scrutiny and political debate. Throughout the existence of a formal
defense organization, its methods of monetary manipulation to achieve
ends have spawned controversy. This chapter will describe some of
the budgetary and political processes that have affected defense
spending from the Korean War to the present.
At the most basic level, a budget is a statement relating income to
expenditures. At the federal level, the government budget is, in
addition, the most complex of public policies and the clearest
statement that we have of the actual priorities of the national
government. [Ref. 7]
The priorities of the legislative and executive branches rarely coalesce
into a simple compromise. The annual defense budget reflects various
interpretations of national security requirements, as well as pork
barrel patronage spending. In addition, all aspects of the federal
government expenditures are influenced by the current economic
conditions, international relations, and reactions to high-impact
events.
Certain aspects of budgeting literature concerning power status
can be divided into two alternative paradigms. The first is the concept
of the Institutional approach. The essence of this theory is that power
resides in the position held within an organization, not the individual
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in that position [Ref. 8]. Power is related to status, a status that cor-
relates to a repository of power. The Pluralist approach, on the other
hand, defines power as a function of actual participation in decision-
making processes and not merely the holding of a key position [Ref. 8].
Power exists in personal interactions, as well as in formal status. The
purpose of introducing these terms is to understand the approach to
budget control practiced by key figures in defense budget formulation
and execution. Presidents, congressmen, and Secretaries of Defense
all have reflected a belief in one or the other of these concepts
through their actions.
The roles of the President and Congress in the budget process are
discussed at length in other works (Refs. 9, 10]. The President's
office annually introduces a defense spending proposal. This proposal
is usually a focused one. The defense budget, as with the remainder of
the federal budget, must pass through the halls of Congress before
returning to the President for final approval. "Because of power given
to it by Constitution, statute, and practice, the Congress is one of the
most important institutions in the budgetary process." [Ref. 8] Fenno
notes that the essential bulwark of congressional power (in the con-
text of the Appropriations Committee) is in protecting the power of
the purse and serving as a guardian of the federal treasury. The role of
the Senate Appropriations Committee, on the other hand, is that of an
appeals court between agencies and the House [Ref. 11]. The House
committee staff reflects an emphasis on technical budgetary expertise
with minimal political experience. The Senate staff is more policy-
oriented and more politically experienced." [Ref. 8]
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Regarding defense budgeting, Kanter [Ref. 12] noted that an
uncritical examination of Congress* influence in the 1960s showed
that Congress had little impact on the Pentagon. By breaking the
budget down into expenditure categories, he discovered that most
congressional changes in the defense budget concentrated in
procurement and research and development. Later chapters will
discuss categorical expenditure trends for the service departments.
A. INCREMENTAL VS. PROGRAMMATIC
The debate over the year-to-year progressive nature of the federal
budget has resulted in two interpretations of the process. The first
line of thought is the incremental theory. Increments are calculated
from an existing base, which can be defined as "commonly held
expectations among participants in budgeting that programs will be
carried out at close to the going level of expenditures." [Ref. 13] The
base does not normally come under scrutiny.
Wildavsky felt that the incremental approach is the most impor-
tant aid to budget calculation. [Ref. 13]
The theory of budgeting incrementalism has also had considerable
impact on our thinking about relations between Congress and the
Executive branch. Based on a pluralistic notion of power, it holds
that only marginal changes will be made from year to year in the
level of an agency's appropriation. [Ref. 8]
This statement implies that congressional impact on budget items is
not significant.
Other literature differs from this interpretation of congressional
influence. By dividing the "base" into controllable and uncontrollable
portions, the incremental change seems more affected by Congress,
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when considering the controllable portion of the budget. Leloup
[Ref. 14] proposed that there is a myth of incrementalism. that it is a
theory biased toward stability and against change. Incrementalism. he
adds, is self-fulfilling in nature.
The second school of budgeting theory is that of programmatic
budgeting. In the 1960s and early 1970s, program budgeting was
introduced into the federal government under the Planning-Program-
ming-Budgetary-System (PPBS). It was first introduced into the
Department of Defense by Secretary Robert McNamara in 1961. "It
was an attempt by the federal government to move away from an
incremental decision process into a rational-comprehensive mode."
[Ref. 15]
PPBS proposed achievement of the budget by: (1) specification of
goals; (2) identification of alternative mechanisms for achieving the
goals; (3) cost-benefit analysis of each alternative; and (4) long-term
(multi-year) planning and analysis [Ref. 15].
One of the reasons for PPBS's introduction into DOD was that, as
of 1961, centralization within DOD was unsatisfactory. The services
remained essentially independent entities. "Each service emphasized
its own missions at the expense of joint missions." [Ref. 16] The
defense budget was not the vital policy instrument it should have been.
It was merely a bookkeeping device to keep track of service expendi-
tures. It was not very helpful in planning and analysis. For example,
duplication in RDT&E was labeled as a problem in the early 1960s. A
centralized process could keep a more effective tab on redundancies
among the services.
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Some have argued t±iat rivalries between the services is a great gain
because both Congress and the public can be kept informed of con-
troversial issues when policy is at a formative stage and can then
exert an influence on the outcome. (Ref. 17]
The fundamental idea behind PPBS in defense was based on explicit
criteria for defense programs, not merely decisions by compromise
among institutions. [Ref. 16]
The purpose of PPBS was to develop these criteria.
Two points that McNamara's introduction of PPBS in 1961 hoped
to resolve were the role of the Secretary of Defense and centralization
as policy in DOD budgeting.
The PPBS has become the device by which to do the centralized
planning; through it national security objectives are related to strat-
egy; strategy to forces, forces to resources, and resources to costs.
[Ref. 6]
The feeling existed that the revolution in military technology and the
large amount being spent on defense required this centralization.
Under PPBS. more and better information was now available to the
Secretary and others. In addition, alternative choices were identified
for centralized decision making.
The vehicle introduced in DOD to carry out PPBS was the Five-
Year Defense Plan (FYDP). This plan initiated multi-year budget
streams, allowed for long-range force level planning, and provided
data for adequate analysis and subsequent budget revisions. Military
programs were broken down into basic "program elements" which
combined costs and benefits of specific details of a program. The
FYDP aided the services in coordinated planning and assured orderly
program changes.
While McNamara introduced PPBS in DOD, he did not fully intend
for centralization to dominate all aspects of DOD management. "A
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fundamental principle of management, in his view, was never do
anything at a higher echelon that can be done at a lower echelon."
[Ref. 6] Regardless of this sentiment. McNamara still practiced an
informed, dynamic, centralized style of leadership. Other Secretaries
of Defense established themselves as ranging from aggressive,
centralized leaders to passive implementers of presidential policy.
There were some inherent drawbacks to the PPBS system. The
two most noteworthy were first, the large staff requirements to
implement and maintain the system, and second, the lack of trained
personnel to perform the often sophisticated calculations required.
B. THE STUDY
The influences discussed in this chapter are but a few in the
overall development and execution of the defense budget. Theses by
Anderson and Benson [Refs. 1. 2] have evaluated the various aspects of
budget theory relating to DOD and DON spending, respectively. The
next two chapters will analyze the budget numbers for the Depart-
ments of the Army and Air Force. The research question for this
thesis was to discover the extent to which each service was identical
to or departed from the historical spending pattern of the Department
of Defense. The answer that we will see in Chapters V and VI is that,
although Benson concluded that DON resembles DOD, the Army and
Air Force show greater deviation from the aggregate.
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m. DATA BASE AND RESULTS. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
A. SOURCES AND EXPLANATIONS
The primary sources of budget data are the same as listed in
Chapter I— The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal
Years 1955 through 1986 and The Economic Report of the President
for 1985 [Refs. 4, 5]. This chapter will apply Anderson's analytical
approach to the Department of the Army.
This thesis discusses only the four largest categories found in
Department of the Army (DOA) appropriations. The four categories
are Military Personnel (MP), Operations and Maintenance (O&M),
Procurement (PROC), and Research, Development. Testing, and
Evaluation (RDT&E). These four categories account for the bulk of
DOA spending for any given year, averaging 93 percent in 1955 and 96
percent in 1985.
The Military Personnel category includes all active and reserve
personnel contingents under the cognizance of the DOA. Several years
covered in this study also include appropriate aspects of the Army
National Guard personnel whose funding came from the DOA budget
funds.
The Operations and Maintenance category refers to funds allo-
cated to cover the costs of maintaining and operating all equipment
used in direct line or support functions of Army missions.
The Procurement category refers to the costs of acquiring air-
craft, missiles, vehicles, weapons, and other equipment used in the
18
DOA. It should be noted that during the period of the study the sub-
categories under Procurement changed administratively but the items
covered remained the same.
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation refers to the
funding allocated to the engineering and administrative aspects of
development of equipment.
The figures emphasized are the actual outlays for each fiscal year.
This modifies the approach taken by Benson in her analysis of the
Department of the Navy. Benson used budget year estimates for each
year. Actual outlay figures are a more accurate measurement of the
total budgeting and related political processes. Appendices B, C, and
D demonstrate that the differences between estimates and actual
expenditures are sometimes significant.
B. RESULTS
A look at the aggregate DOA picture shows that outlays rose from
$9,891 billion in 1955 (current dollars) to $51 billion in 1984. This
reflects an average annual Increase of $1,422 billion. Upon conversion
to 1972 constant dollars, we see that the range is narrowed. Outlays
totaled $16,257 billion in 1955 as compared to $22,891 billion in
1984, which reflects a constant dollar average annual increase of only
$.228 billion. Looking at individual years shows a different pattern
than the average increase, with the size and direction of the annual
changes varying greatly during the 30 years covered.
19
1. Distribution Behavior
Figure 3.1 represents the overall Army spending trends for
the period covered. Although the overall picture shows an increase
from start to finish, the peaks and valleys point out dramatic yearly
changes, such as the large increases during the height of the Vietnam
conflict.
Figure 3.2 shows how the four DOA major categories main-
tained their basic relative rank during the years presented. Although
Procurement had more erratic behavior relative to the amounts
involved in the category, and Operations and Maintenance overtook
Military Personnel as the lead category, the aggregate picture settles
into a common pattern throughout.
Table 3.1 is a good indicator of DOA's spending emphasis in
any given year. The breakdown by percent of total Army outlays
reflects department priorities combined with the political affects of
external influences for that year.
2. Availabilitv of Funds
This analysis will follow a model established by Anderson in
his thesis on Department of Defense outlay distribution [Ref. Ij. This
model was also used by Benson in her thesis concerning Department
of the Navy spending [Ref. 2). Comparisons to the DOD and DON
studies will be discussed in chapter V.
Anderson broke his DOD data into three basic year periods.
The "Abundant" top ten years consist of the ten years that exper-
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CATEGORIES AS A PERCENT OF ARMY
MAJOR OUTLAYS TOTAL
(Current Dollars)
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 9.891 42.9 26.7 26.6 3.8
1956 8,651 45.7 31.2 18.3 4.8
1957 8,674 43.3 33.3 18.5 5.0
1958 8,859 42.5 34.7 17.5 5.4
1959 8,951 40.2 35.6 18.2 6.0
1960 9,037 40.2 34.2 17.8 7.8
1961 9,266 38.5 35.0 14.9 11.6
1962 10,470 36.4 35.7 15.6 12.3
1963 10.998 34.0 31.1 23.3 11.6
1964 11.455 36.4 31.8 20.2 11.7
1965 11.297 41.6 31.0 15.6 11.9
1966 13,846 37.8 32.7 19.3 10.2
1967 20.040 34.7 35.2 21.9 8.2
1968 23,224 34.5 34.1 25.1 6.2
1969 24,399 35.8 32.9 25.1 6.2
1970 23,762 39.2 31.9 21.9 7.0
1971 22,009 40.7 32.4 19.8 7.1
1972 21.351 39.8 33.6 18.2 8.3
1973 19.206 41.6 34.0 14.5 10.0
1974 19,663 41.5 33.2 14.2 11.1
1975 20,031 43.0 34.6 12.6 9.8
1976 19,264 45.7 37.7 7.0 9.6
1977 21,804 42.0 36.5 12.0 9.5
1978 24,153 40.2 36.7 13.4 9.7
1979 26,639 38.2 36.0 16.8 9.0
1980 30,307 36.6 36.6 17.9 8.9
1981 34,944 36.8 35.2 19.6 8.5
1982 41,302 36.3 35.6 20.3 7.8
1983 47.066 33.6 34.3 24.3 7.8
1984 51,134 32.4 33.6 26.5 7.5
MEAN 39.37 33.9 18.56 8.48
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The "Middle" years likewise include the next ten years under the
percent increase criteria, and the bottom nine years are labeled the
"Lean" years when DOD funds were "tight."
Table 3.2 presents the constant dollar data for the Abundant
years in terms of percent of the total spent per category. The
ordering of the years is descending with the top receiving the largest
increase from the previous year. Military Personnel received the
highest average of funds for these years. The Army is a manpower-
intensive organization, so this revelation comes as no surprise. O&M
is second during abundant years, but not far behind MP. In three of
the ten years. O&M exceeded MP. Procurement was third and
RDT&E last. Figure 3.3 depicts this relationship graphically.
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4 present the "Middle" years of this
format. Once again. MP received the largest share of the total, with
O&M second, followed by Procurement and RDT&E respectively. The
graph shows that the pattern is similar for all four categories.
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.5 present the data for the "Lean"
years. Despite the difference in overall availability of DOD funds, the
DOA maintained its apparent spending priorities, with MP receiving
the largest share, followed by O&M, Procurement, and RDT&E.
3. Growth Rates
Table 3.5 presents DOA outlays as a percent change from the
previous fiscal year. We find that during the period covered, total
Army spending rose 1.66 percent in constant dollar terms. Individual
categories show that MP grew an average of .53 percent. O&M 2.65
24
TABLE 3.2







1982 35.6 20.3 19.916
1968 34.5 34.1 25.1 6.2 28.137
1963 34.0 31.1 23.3 11.6 15.346
1983 33.6 34.3 24.3 7.8 21.857
1967 34.7 35.2 21.9 8.2 25.347
1960 40.2 34.2 17.8 7.8 13.155
1984 32.4 33.6 26.5 7.5 22.891
1977 42.0 36.5 12.0 9.5 15.569
1964 36.4 31.8 20.2 11.7 15.740
1969 35.8 32.9 25.1 6.2 28.113
MEAN 36.0 33.9 21.7 8.4 20.611
MED 35.25 34.2 22.6 7.8 20.887
TABLE 3.3










1958 42.5 34.7 17.5 5.4 13.414
1962 36.4 35.7 15.6 12.3 14.828
1976 45.7 37.7 7.0 9.6 14.557
1959 40.2 35.6 18.2 6.0 13.241
1978 40.2 36.7 13.4 9.7 16.057
1975 43.0 34.6 12.6 9.8 15.924
1973 41.6 34.0 14.5 10.0 18.161
1961 38.5 35.0 14.9 11.6 13,366
1974 41.5 33.2 14.2 11.1 17.086
MEAN 40.6 35.2 14.8 9.4 15,450
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33.6 18.2 8.3 21.350
36.6 17.9 8.9 16,986
36.0 16.8 9.0 16.300
32.7 19.3 10.2 18.039
31.9 21.9 7.0 25.985
33.3 18.5 5.0 13.358
31.0 15.6 11.9 15,193
31.2 18.3 4.8 13.777
32.4 19.8 7.1 22.924
33.2 18.5 8.0 18,212
32.7 18.3 8.3 16.986
TABLE 3.4
PERCENT OF DOA TOTAL—LEAN YEARS
(Constant Dollars)












percent, PROC 5.38 percent, and RDT&E 4.6 percent. The aggregate
picture is slightly deceiving, covering the more lively behavior
displayed by the individual categories. Examples of this lively behavior
include a 41.6 percent decrease in procurement in 1956 relative to
1955. and an 82.9 percent increase in PROC in 1977 from 1976.
Figure 3.6 perhaps portrays a better visual image of this percent
change concept. The endpoints of the graph go from a start of -15.3
percent to an end of +4.7 percent. There are years in the middle that
represent anomalies due to the size of the increase or decrease. An
example of this is the 40.5 percent growth from 1966 to 1967, due




PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR
(Constant Dollars)
FY DOA MP O&M PROG RDT&E
1956 -15.3 -9.7 -1.0 -41.6 6.1
1957 -3.0 -8.2 3.4 -2.2 1.7
1958 .4 -1.4 4.8 -5.1 7.6
1959 -1.3 -6.6 1.3 2.7 10.7
1960 - .7 -0.6 -4.5 -2.9 28.6
1961 1.6 -2.8 3.9 -14.8 51.5
1962 10.9 5.0 13.3 16.0 17.1
1963 3.5 -3.4 -10.1 54.9 -1.8
1964 2.6 9.8 4.9 -11.1 2.9
1965 -3.5 10.4 -6.0 -25.4 -1.7
1966 18.7 8.1 25.5 46.7 1.8
1967 40.5 28.9 51.5 59.6 12.3
1968 11.2 10.4 7.6 27.4 -16.0
1969 -2.1 3.5 -3.7 -0.4 0.9
1970 -7.6 1.3 -10.5 -19.2 3.9
1971 -11.8 -8.5 -10.4 -20.3 -10.3
1972 -6.9 -8.9 -3.2 -14.2 8.9
1973 -14.9 -11.1 -14.1 -32.5 1.6
1974 -5.9 -6.2 -7.9 -8.0 5.3
1975 -6.8 -3.3 -2.9 -17.4 -17.9
1976 -8.6 -2.9 - .4 -48.8 -10.9
1977 7.0 -1.6 3.3 82.9 6.1
1978 3.1 -1.3 3.9 14.5 5.4
1979 1.5 -3.6 -0.5 27.5 -5.3
1980 4.2 -0.1 5.8 11.2 12.5
1981 5.2 5.6 1.2 15.4 -0.3
1982 11.5 10.1 12.9 15.3 3.0
1983 9.8 1.6 5.9 31.4 9.1
1984 4.7 0.9 2.7 14.3 0.5

















Returning to the three-period model. Table 3.6 presents the
"Abundant" years as a percent increase from the previous fiscal year.
Aided by a few outliers, the total and each of the four categories
received a significant average increase. Procurement, not MP, had the
largest average increase, with a mean of 27.1 percent. O&M was
second. RDT&E was third, and MP fourth. Anderson's DOD study
reflected a rank order of PROC, RDT&E, O&M. and then MP for the
same years.
TABLE 3.6
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS
FISCAL YEAR—ABUNDANT YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY ARMY MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1982 11.5 10.1 12.9 15.3 3.0
1968 11.2 10.4 7.6 27.4 -16.0
1963 3.5 -3.4 -10.1 54.9 -1.8
1983 9.8 1.6 5.9 31.4 9.1
1967 40.5 28.9 51.5 59.6 12.3
1960 -0.7 -0.6 -4.5 -2.9 28.6
1984 4.7 0.9 2.7 14.3 0.5
1977 7.0 -1.6 3.3 82.9 6.1
1964 2.6 9.8 4.9 -11.1 2.9
1969 -2.1 3.5 -3.7 -0.4 0.9
MEAN 8.2 6.0 7.1 27.1 4.6
MED 5.85 2.55 4.1 21.35 2.95
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Table 3.7 reflects the "Middle" years as a percent change
from the previous year. The Army average for these years was a 1.6
percent decrease. RDT&E fared the best with an average increase of 7
percent. O&M was second. MP was third, and Procurement exper-
ienced a noteworthy average decrease of 7.8 percent. Anderson's DOD
data showed a rank order of RDT&E, O&M, MP. and then PROC for
the "Middle" years.
TABLE 3.7
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS
FISCAL YEAR-MIDDLE YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
¥Y APIMY MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1981 5.2 5.6 1.2 15.4 -0.3
1958 .4 -1.4 4.8 -5.1 7.6
1962 10.9 5.0 13.3 16.0 17.1
1976 -8.6 -2.9 -0.4 -48.8 -10.9
1959 -1.3 -6.6 1.3 2.7 10.7
1978 3.1 -1.3 3.9 14.5 5.4
1975 -6.8 -3.3 -2.9 -17.4 -17.9
1973 -14.9 -11.1 -14.1 -32.5 1.6
1961 1.6 -2.8 3.9 -14.8 51.5
1974 -5.9 -6.2 -7.9 -8.0 5.3
MEAN -1.6 -2.5 .3 -7.8 7.0
MED -0.45 -2.85 1.25 -6.55 5.35
Table 3.8 covers the "Lean" years for the percent change
analysis. The DOA total mean was a 2.63 percent annual cut. RDT&E
continued its growth trend with a mean increase of 2.61 percent.
O&M again was second, followed by MP. Procurement was the biggest
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loser for the "Lean" years. The "Lean" years for DOD showed a rank
order of MP. O&M, RDT&E, and PROC. All four categories had a mean
loss in the "Lean" years.
TABLE 3.8
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS
FISCAL YEAR-LEAN YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY ARMY MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1972 -6.9 -8.9 -3.2 -14.2 8.9
1980 4.2 -0.1 5.8 11.2 12.5
1979 1.5 -3.6 -0.5 27.5 -5.3
1966 18.7 8.1 25.5 46.7 1.8
1970 -7.6 1.3 -10.5 -19.2 3.9
1957 -3.0 -8.2 3.4 -5.1 7.6
1965 -3.5 10.4 -6.0 -25.4 -1.7
1956 -15.3 -9.7 -1.0 -41.6 6.1
1971 -11.8 -8.5 -10.4 -20.3 -10.3
MEAN -2.63 -2.13 0.34 -4.49 2.61
MED -3.5 -3.6 1.0 -14.2 3.9
Combining the three periods shows us that PROC exper-
ienced the greatest variability, which appears to be related to the
availability of funds. Although the lowest in the "Abundant" years,
RDT&E fared the relative best in the other two periods, and was the
only category that had consistent significant growth. RDT&E's
consistency may be related to the fact that it only amounts to a small
amount of the DOA total, and might therefore be less likely to
experience drastic cuts or increases.
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O&M maintained positive average growth for all three
periods, ranking second in each. MP was third in all three periods.
In two of the periods, MP experienced average decreases, which
would seem unusual for this manpower-intensive organization.
C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In accordance with the Anderson format. Tables 3.9 and 3.10
depict the relative rank of the four spending categories as a percent
increase from the previous fiscal year for each of the three periods.
TABLE 3.9
RELATIVE RANKINGS OF OUTLAY CATEGORIES, DOA






















RELATIVE RANKINGS OF APPROPRLATION CATEGORIES. DOD
(Percent Change from Previous Year)
AVAILABILITY
OF FUNDS MP O&M PROC RDT&E
"ABUNDANT" 4 3 1 2
"MIDDLE" 3 2 4 1
"LEAN" 2 3 4 1
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Table 3.9 presents DOA data, while Table 3.10 is an extract from
Anderson's DOD data. It must be noted that Anderson's data is
derived from budget year estimates of outlays, whereas the DOAF data
represents actual outlays, but this is not a significant difference.
The correlation of the two tables is not very good. Army
Procurement is the only category that follows the DOD rankings
exactly. RDT&E matches in two of the periods, but MP and O&M only
once.
The trend that is evident is that DOA places consistent emphasis
on the areas of Military Personnel and Operations and Maintenance,
regardless of the availability of DOD funds. This consistency may be
related to the fact that MP and O&M are largely programmed and
spent in a single budget year, with small unexpended balances or
budget authority carried over to succeeding fiscal years. Conversely.
Procurement and RDT&E are multi-year ventures, often with long lead
time. In essence, these categories are somewhat removed from the
present eye of the budgeter, and fluctuations in these categories may
be easier to swallow. MP and O&M exist in the present, and as such
would have quicker reactions to budget cuts and increases.
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IV. DATA BASE AND RESULTS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
A. SOURCES AND EXPLANATIONS
This chapter examines Air Force data to determine whether
spending trends exist as found in DOD. The primary sources of budget
data remain the same: The Budget of the United States Government
for fiscal years 1955 through 1986 and The Economic Report of the
President for 1985 [Refs. 4, 5]. To facilitate comparison to other mili-
tary departments, only the four major appropriation categories of the
Department of the Air Force will be discussed.
The Military Personnel (MP) category includes all active duty and
reserve personnel under the cognizance of DOAF budget funds. The
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) covers the costs of operating and
maintaining equipment used in direct line or support functions of
DOAF missions.
The Procurement (PROG) category refers to the cost of acquiring
aircraft, missiles, and other equipment used by the DOAF. Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) describes outlays for
the process of design and testing of equipment. These latter two
categories are usually programmed as multi-year endeavors, although
only single-year budgets will be discussed.
Appendices F, G. and H present the actual outlays for the years
considered, the budget year estimates, and the differences between
actuals and estimates. The differences highlighted in Appendix H
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reflect the different approach of this thesis as opposed to the DON
analysis completed by Benson, in which she used budget year esti-
mates as the basis for discussion. The DOAF analysis of this chapter
will be limited to actual outlays for each year.
B. RESULTS
The aggregate DOAF picture shows that outlays rose from $15.3
billion in 1955 to $64,528 billion in 1984 (constant dollars). This
breaks down to an average annual increase of $1,697 billion. The con-
version of these figures to 1972 constant dollars squeezes the range
from $25.15 billion in 1955 to $28,887 billion in 1984. This modified
table reflects an average annual increase of only $129 million.
1. Distribution Behavior
Figure 4. 1 graphically depicts Air Force budget outlay behav-
ior for the period of the study. The overall picture shows that there
was a total increase over the 30 years. Specific year-to-year review
shows dramatic increases and decreases at times, with the greatest
change as a decrease during the declining years of the Vietnam
conflict.
Figure 4.2 shows the breakdown by category of Air Force
spending trends. Three of the four categories show a fairly flat pro-
gression, while Procurement's trend was fairly erratic. Overall, the
relative rankings of the four categories stay the same, with only
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2. Availability of Funds
This chapter again follows the Anderson format and incorpo-
rates some aspects of Benson's thesis. Brief comparisons to Army and
Navy will be discussed in Chapter V. Table 4. 1 presents DOAF cate-
gories as a percent of the DOAF sum.
Table 4.2 presents constant dollar figures for the "Abundant"
years in terms of percent of total dollars spent on each category. The
sequence of years in the table follows a more to less progression.
Procurement had the highest average for these years. Operations and
Maintenance was second. Since the Air Force purchases and main-
tains large numbers of expensive equipage such as aircraft, it seems
logical that these two categories would receive the most attention.
Military Personnel was third in rank. Despite being fourth. RDT&E
received a significant part of the total. Figure 4.3 presents this
relationship.
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4 present the breakdown, by category,
of the "Middle" years. Procurement was the lead category on the
average. Procurement, however, took a large decrease in the middle
portion of the pattern and finished the period second to O&M. O&M
on the average was second for the period, with MP third and RDT&E
fourth.
The "Lean" years for the Air Force are presented in Table 4.4
and Figure 4.5. Like the preceding two periods. Procurement again
received the highest percentage of the total. The pattern is
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TABLE 4.1
CATEGORIES AS A PERCENT OF AIR FORCE
MAJOR OUTLAYS TOTAL
(Current Dollars)
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 15.301 23.0 21.6 52.5 2.9
1956 15,340 24.8 23.8 47.3 4.1
1957 16.901 22.2 24.2 49.3 4.3
1958 17,266 22.4 21.9 51.7 4.0
1959 17.665 22.8 23.8 48.9 4.6
1960 17.876 21.9 23.0 49.0 6.1
1961 20,407 19.5 21.0 51.4 8.2
1962 19,651 21.2 22.4 46.0 10.4
1963 19,493 20.8 22.3 40.0 16.9
1964 19,927 22.8 23.6 34.9 18.7
1965 17,374 26.5 26.0 29.4 18.1
1966 19,228 25.7 25.6 33.4 15.3
1967 22,135 24.1 24.7 36.6 14.6
1968 24,870 23.0 23.9 37.8 15.3
1969 25,587 23.8 26.6 36.3 13.2
1970 24,508 26.7 27.2 34.1 12.0
1971 23.032 29.1 27.7 31.0 12.2
1972 23.142 30.8 29.2 26.1 13.9
1973 23,059 31.9 28.4 25.1 14.6
1974 22,891 32.7 29.7 23.5 14.2
1975 24,056 31.7 32.2 22.4 13.8
1976 25,074 29.7 31.5 25.5 13.3
1977 26,352 28.2 31.8 26.3 13.7
1978 27,574 27.9 32.3 26.6 13.2
1979 30,631 26.4 31.2 29.1 13.3
1980 37,001 23.6 33.4 29.5 13.6
1981 44,239 22.9 32.9 29.9 14.3
1982 52,088 22.6 31.0 31.4 15.0
1983 58,931 21.3 29.4 33.7 15.6
1984 64,528 20.2 27.3 36.5 16.0
MEAN 25.01 26.99 35.84 12.18
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TABLE 4.2
PERCENT OF DOAF TOTAL—ABUNDANT YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY MP O&M PROC RDT&E TOTAL
1982 22.6 31.0 31.4 15.0 25.117
1968 23.0 23.9 37.8 15.3 30.131
1963 20.8 22.3 40.0 16.9 27.198
1983 21.3 29.4 33.7 15.6 27.367
1967 24.1 24.7 36.6 14.6 27.997
1960 21.9 23.0 49.0 6.1 26.021
1984 20.2 27.3 36.5 16.0 28.887
1977 28.2 31.8 26.3 13.7 18,816
1964 22.8 23.6 34.9 18.7 27.383
1969 23.8 26.6 36.3 13.2 29,482
MEAN 22.9 26.4 36.3 14.5 26.840
MED 22.7 25.7 36.45 15.15 27,375
TABLE 4.3
PERCENT OF DOAF TOTAL—MIDDLE YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY MP O&M PROC RDT&E TOTAL
1981 22.9 32.9 29.9 14.5 22,617
1958 22.4 21.9 51.7 4.0 26,145
1962 21.2 22.4 46.0 10.4 27,830
1976 29.7 31.5 25.5 13.3 18.947
1959 22.8 23.8 48.9 4.6 26,132
1978 27.9 32.3 26.6 13.2 18,331
1975 31.7 32.2 22.4 13.8 19,124
1973 31.9 28.4 25.1 14.6 21.806
1961 19.5 21.0 51.4 8.2 29,408
1974 32.7 29.7 23.5 14.2 19,892
MEAN 26.3 27.6 35.1 11.1 23,023
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29.2 26.1 13.9 23,142
33.4 29.5 13.6 20.738
31.2 29.1 13.3 18.744
25.7 33.4 15.3 25.049
27.2 34.1 12.0 26.799
24.2 49.3 4.3 26.030
26.0 29.4 18.1 23.365
23.8 47.3 4.1 24,431
11J 31.0 12.2 23.989
27.6 34.4 11.9 23.587
21.1 31.0 13.3 23.989
TABLE 4.4
PERCENT OF DOAF TOTAL—LEAN YEARS
(Constant Dollars)












completed with O&M second. MP third, and RDT&E fourth. Figure
4.5 shows an interesting pattern in that Procurement started first,
finished second, and was as low as third in 1972. Similarly, O&M and
MP displayed relative ranking changes for the years represented.
3. Growth Rates
Table 4.5 presents DOAF outlays as a percent change from the
previous fiscal year for total and categorical spending. Total Air Force
spending rose at an average of less than one percent. The breakdown
by category shows that RDT&E experienced consistent growth by
enjoying an eight-percent average annual increase. O&M was second,
with an average increase of 1.47 percent, while MP and Procurement
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PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR
(Constant Dollars)
FY DOAF MP O&M PROG RDT&E
1956 -2.9 4.7 7.1 -12.4 35.2
1957 6.5 -4.7 8.2 11.1 13.2
1958 0.4 1.2 -8.9 5.3 -6.4
1959 0.0 1.7 8.3 -5.5 14.6
1960 -0.4 -4.4 -3.4 -0.1 31.8
1961 13.0 0.9 2.9 18.4 51.5
1962 -5.4 2.8 1.2 -15.2 20.6
1963 -2.3 -4.2 -2.9 -14.9 58.8
1964 0.7 10.6 6.2 -12.2 11.1
1965 -14.7 -1.0 -5.7 -28.3 -17.3
1966 7.2 4.0 5.4 21.8 -9.2
1967 11.8 4.9 7.8 22.6 6.3
1968 7.6 2.6 4.1 11.3 12.7
1969 -2.2 1.4 9.0 -6.1 -15.3
1970 -9.1 2.0 -7.2 -14.6 -17.7
1971 -10.5 -2.5 -8.7 -18.7 -8.9
1972 -3.5 2.2 1.5 -18.6 9.5
1973 -5.8 -2.6 -8.3 -9.4 -0.8
1974 -8.8 -6.5 -4.5 -14.9 -11.5
1975 -3.9 -6.9 4.1 -8.1 -6.6
1976 -0.9 -7.2 -2.9 12.7 -4.1
1977 -0.7 -5.7 0.3 2.3 2.4
1978 -2.6 -3.4 -1.1 -1.3 -6.7
1979 2.3 -3.4 -1.3 11.8 3.5
1980 10.6 -1.3 18.5 12.1 12.7
1981 9.1 5.8 7.3 10.8 15.3
1982 11.1 9.9 4.8 16.5 15.9
1983 9.0 2.5 3.3 17.1 13.5
1984 5.6 4.5 -2.2 14.0 8.7
MEAN 0.73 0.27 1.47 0.26 8.03
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Figure 4.6 is a better indicator of growth trends of the Air
Force total. The endpoints of the graph go from a -2.9 percent in
1956 to 5.6 percent in 1984. Extreme points range from +11.8
percent change in 1967 to a -14.7 percent change felt in 1965.
Table 4.6 presents the "Abundant" years in terms of growth
rates. All four categories had a positive growth average. RDT&E led
the group with a significant average increase of 14.6 percent.
Procurement fared well, averaging over 5 percent. O&M and MP had
growth rates of 2.7 and 2.2 percent, respectively. DOD, according to
Anderson, experienced a rank order of PROC, RDT&E, O&M, and then
MP during the "Abundant" period.
Table 4.7 presents the "Middle" years as a percent change
from the previous year. The Air Force average for this period was -0.5
percent. RDT&E was the only category to experience positive growth,
with a rate of 6.6 percent. O&M had a rate of -0.2 percent.
Procurement -0-.7 percent, and MP -1.42 percent on the average.
Anderson's study reflects a DOD rank order of RDT&E, O&M, MP, and
then PROC during the "Middle" years.
The "Lean" years' growth rates are presented in Table 4.8.
The Air Force average growth was poor, with a -1.41 percent change.
RDT&E managed the best positive trend, with an average increase of
2.1 percent. O&M had a positive average also, but only at a rate of 1.8
percent, while MP broke even for the period in terms of percent

































PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS
FISCAL YEAR-ABUNDANT YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DOAF MP O&M PROG RDT&E
1982 11.1 9.9 4.8 16.5 15.9
1968 7.6 2.6 4.1 11.3 12.7
1963 -2.3 -4.2 -2.9 -14.9 58.8
1983 9.0 2.5 3.3 17.1 13.5
1967 11.8 4.9 7.8 22.6 6.3
1960 -0.4 -4.4 -3.4 -0.1 31.8
1984 5.6 4.5 -2.2 14.0 8.7
1977 -0.7 -5.7 0.3 2.3 2.4
1964 0.7 10.6 6.2 -12.2 11.1
1969 -2.2 1.4 9.0 -6.1 -15.3
MEAN 4.02 2.21 2.7 5.05 14.59
MED 3.15 2.55 3.7 6.8 11.9
TABLE 4.7
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS
FISCAL YEAR-MIDDLE YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DOAF MP O&M PROG RDT&E
1981 9.1 5.8 7.3 1.08 1.53
1958 0.4 1.2 -8.9 5.3 -6.4
1962 -5.4 2.8 1.2 -15.2 20.6
1976 -0.9 -7.2 -2.9 12.7 -4.1
1959 0.0 1.7 8.3 -5.5 14.6
1978 -2.6 -3.4 -1.1 -1.3 -6.7
1975 -3.9 -6.9 4.1 -8.1 -6.6
1973 -5.8 -2.6 -8.3 -9.4 -0.8
1961 13.0 0.9 2.9 18.4 51.5
1974 -8.8 -6.5 -4.5 -14.9 -11.5
MEAN -0.49 -1.42 -0.19 -0.72 6.59
MED -1.75 -0.85 0.05 -3.4 -2.45
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TABLE 4.8
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS
FISCAL YEAR-LEAN YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DOAF MP Q&M PROG RDT&E
1972 -3.5 2.2 1.5 -18.6 9.5
1980 10.6 -1.3 18.5 12.1 12.7
1979 2.3 -3.4 -1.3 11.8 3.5
1966 7.2 4.0 5.4 21.8 -9.2
1970 -9.1 2.0 -7.2 -14.6 -17.7
1957 6.5 -4.7 8.2 11.1 13.2
1965 -14.7 -1.0 -5.7 -28.3 -17.3
1956 -2.9 4.7 7.1 -12.4 35.2
1971 -10.5 -2.5 -8.7 -18.7 -8.9
MEAN -1.41 0.0 1.78 -3.58 2.1
MED -2.9 -1.0 1.5 -12.4 3.5
DOD experienced a rank order during the "Lean" years of
MP, O&M, RDT&E. and PROC. with each category suffering a loss on
the average.
By taking a combined look at the three periods, we see that
RDT&E showed a consistent positive growth relative to the overall
availability of DOD funds. Procurement displayed the greatest average
variability, while MP and O&M had subtle changes in both positive and
negative directions over the years.
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C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In accordance with the Anderson format. Tables 4.9 and 4.10
depict the relative rank of the four spending categories as a percent
increase from the previous fiscal year for each of the three periods.
TABLE 4.9
RELATIVE RANKINGS OF OUTLAY CATEGORIES, DOAF






















RELATIVE RANKINGS OF APPROPRIATION CATEGORIES, DOD
(Percent Change from Previous Year)
AVAILABILITY
OF FUNDS MP O&M PROC RDT&E
ABUNDANT 4 3 1 2
MIDDLE 3 2 4 1
LEAN 2 3 4 1
Table 4.9 presents DOAF actual outlays, while Table 4.10 is an
extract from Anderson's DOD data. It must be noted that Anderson's
data is derived from budget estimates of outlays, whereas the DOAF
data represents actual outlays.
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The correlation of the two tables is not very good. Air Force
RDT&E and O&M match in two of the periods. Procurement and MP
only match in one period each. By looking at the tables horizontally,
we see that each of the three periods has two categories that match.
Based on Table 4.9, it appears that Air Force RDT&E receives
consistent attention regardless of the availability of funds. Each year
RDT&E received an average increase from the previous fiscal year. MP
and O&M were also fairly consistent in the growth areas. They both
experienced declining growth rates commensurate with the
availability of funds. Procurement, on the other hand, had a growth
rate relative to funds availability. In abundant years Procurement was
second in percent growth. In the middle years. Procurement dropped
to third, and in the lean period it was last. These trends lead me to
conclude that DOAF spending emphasis is consistent for RDT&E, MP,
and O&M. while Procurement is a factor of the availability of funds.
Since Table 4.1 shows that procurement receives the largest portion
of the DOAF total, I believe it would be most open to real growth cuts
in lean years.
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V. COMPARISON OF THE THREE SERVICES
The three services (Army. Air Force, and Navy) distribute their
funds according to the same basic categories. The four major cate-
gories that have been discussed in preceding chapters account for the
bulk of outlays for DOA, DOAF. and DON. Since each service's budget
is a subset of the Department of Defense total, one assumes that DOD
would have a strong influence on the way the services allocate their
funds.
Anderson's thesis discovered patterns in DOD categorical spend-
ing. The purpose of this chapter is to briefly compare the DOA. DOAF,
and DON to determine consistency in outlay distribution among the
services and as subsets of DOD.
A. DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS
Table 5.1 presents the breakdown by percent of total for each of
the major spending categories for DOA, DOAF. and DON. Procurement
is the lead category for DOAF and DON, but only third in the DOA. On
the other hand. MP is the top money category for the DOA, while it is
only third in DOAF and DON. This information reflects the nature of
the organizations themselves. As discussed in Chapter III, the Army is
a manpower-intensive organization and MP would be a logical priority.
The Navy and Air Force purchase and maintain large quantities of
expensive equipment such as aircraft, ships, and missiles, so pro-
curement receives the greatest attention. Similarly, while RDT&E
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receives the least percentage in each of the services, it is the Army
that expends the least in this area relative to the other categories.
O&M was the second largest category by percent of total in each of the
service departments.
TABLE 5.1
CATEGORIES AS A PERCENT OF BUDGET TOTAL
(1955-1984 Average)
SERVICE MP O&M PROG RDT&E
DOA 39.37 33.90 18.56 8.48
DOAF 25.01 26.99 35.84 12.18
DON 27.46 28.97 36.57 9.63
B. SPENDING TRENDS
One method to determine spending trends common among the
services is to compare constant dollar outlays over the 30-year period
of this study.
Figure 5.1 presents the total outlays for each service in constant
(1972) dollars. DOAF started as the highest spender in 1955. but
finished second to DON in 1984. The Army experienced the greatest
variation in the late 1960s, due most likely to the build-up for the
conflict in Southeast Asia. Overall, the trends for service totals are
fairly identical.
Figure 5.2 depicts the spending trends in the Military Personnel
category. The only variation found is the large increase in DOA MP
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Operations and Maintenance is reflected graphically in Figure 5.3.
A familiar pattern is shared by the services. The DOA's 1968 peak due
to Vietnam and DON's recent successes born from President Reagan's
priorities are the only slight anomalies found here.
Figure 5.4 presents the trends in the Procurement area. The first
ten years of the graph show a large deviation among the services.
After 1965, however, the three services' spending habits in the
Procurement category are similar.
Figure 5.5 rounds out the spending trend analysis by presenting
RDT&E figures for the 30-year period. DOA and DON show a relatively
flat, consistent progression. The Air Force behavior is somewhat
erratic in this category.
C. GROWTH RATES
A final method for comparing service departments' spending
trends is to look at year-to-year growth rates. Anderson determined
that trends exist in DOD spending according to periods defined by
availability of funds. Chapters III and IV addressed the comparison to
DOD for the DOA and DOAF, respectively. Certain similarities were
found among the groups when considering percent change from pre-
vious fiscal years. Overall, however, the spending patterns were not
identical.
Benson's thesis [Ref. 2] described a high correlation between DON
and DOD using the percent change approach. Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4
present DOA, DOAF, and DON figures using percent change. This
















































































RELATIVE RANKINGS OF OUTLAY CATEGORIES, DOA
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RELATIVE RANKINGS OF OUTLAY CATEGORIES, DON
(Percent Change from Previous Year)
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example, the Air Force consistently had the greatest percent change
in the RDT&E category. For the Army, RDT&E was the category with
the lowest average percent gain in "Abundant" years, but was the
highest in the "Middle" and "Lean" years. The Navy treats RDT&E
with no apparent consistency by having it rank second in the
"Abundant" years, first in the "Middle" years, and third in the "Lean"
years. The end result is that analysis in accordance with Anderson's





Chapters III. IV, and V have presented trends evident within and
among the three services and DOD. The figures exist as fact. The
reasons behind the figures involve research in an almost limitless sea
of literature.
The defense budget can largely be defined as incremental.
Certain exceptions exist as the result of environmental influences. For
example, the year 1967 saw a large increase in Army actual outlays for
procurement from the previous year. The initial estimate for procure-
ment was $1.9 billion. The estimate was augmented due to the
Vietnam Conflict with a revised total of $3.22 billion. The actual total
for Army procurement outlays was $4,389 billion. The existing peace-
time decision-making processes, even within DOD, were too slow for
the conditions of war [Ref. 161. The difference between estimates and
actual outlays highlights one of the shortcomings of Benson's thesis on
DON. She based her analysis on budget estimates, and estimates alone
may not be an accurate accounting of military spending.
The Vietnam war is an example of exogenous influences discussed
in a 1970 RAND study [Ref. 18]. These influences are not necessarily a
result of combat actions. Secret military reports, the Kennedy assas-
sination, and the launching of the SPUTNIK satellite are examples of
the "random shock" influences that can affect defense budgeting.
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Personalities of key individuals in defense or the political arena
through which the defense budget travels have influenced defense
spending. The statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense was
defined by a series of laws ending with the Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958. Two broad schools concerning the
Secretary's role emerged from the 1958 act. The "traditional" view
holds that, once the President and the Congress determine the
amount to be spent on defense, the Secretary of Defense takes what is
given and allocates it to the services. The opposing view sees the
Secretary as an active manager who correlates national security needs
to shape defense. Since there is no such thing as a "pure" military
requirement, the integrating, active manager approach was pursued by
such notables as Thomas Gates, Robert McNamara, and Clark Clifford
[Ref. 16). The role of the Secretary of Defense until around 1960 was
as a referee for the services. Under McNamara, the Secretary's role
evolved into one of personal involvement in shaping strategy and
forces.
The strength of the personality of other agency heads also influ-
ences the defense budget. Budget emphasis shifts from defense to
non-defense over the years. The heads of other agencies are often
evaluated according to a status that is measured by the budgetary
success of his or her agency [Ref. 13]. Therefore, a strong non-DOD
agency had can lobby funds away from DOD.
The rivalry among the services can often hurt DOD budget efforts.
If Congress observes program redundancy and interservice bickering.
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then the DOD position may be weakened. Rational theorists have been
somewhat preoccupied with pointing out disadvantages of interservice
competition. Secretary McNamara described what he saw concerning
the services:
We found that the three military departments had been establishing
their requirements independently of each other. The results could
be described as fairly chaotic. Army planning, for example, was
based primarily on a long war of attrition. Air Force planning was
based largely on a short war of nuclear bombardment. Consequently
the Army was stating a requirement for stocking months if not years
of combat supplies against the event of a sizeable conventional con-
flict. The Air Force stock requirements for such a war had to be
measured in days, and not very many days at that. Either approach,
consistently followed, might make some sense. The two combined
could not possibly make sense. What we needed was a coordinated
strategy seeking objectives actually attainable with the military
resources available. [Ref. 19]
The above statement supports the claim that each service spends in
accordance with the inherent nature of its own objectives.
The influences of the President as budget drafter and Congress as
budget overseer are evident in every defense dollar spent. Although
this relationship is often depicted as adversarial, it is still a constitu-
tionally based process. There are times when Congress is not so criti-
cal of the President's budget proposal. For example, expediency in
passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave an implicit consent to
establishing an influence on Southeast Asia. The first Foreign
Relations Committee investigation followed in 1966, but after inter-
vention in Vietnam had become well established [Ref. 19). Congress
usually takes the time for a critical review of the President's budget.
In summary, the budget influences listed here are but a few of the
sum of the influences affecting the defense budget. While each
68
specific influence can be researched individually, they are all
interrelated and must be considered in a common arena.
B. SUMMARY
The analysis in this thesis basically approaches DOD spending
trend comparisons from three distinct angles. Distribution of funds,
spending trends, and growth rates are all valid steps in attempting to
decipher the complex methodology pursued in DOD budgeting. In the
final analysis, the following conclusions are derived from this
discussion:
1. The three services do spend their money according to similar
trends. The "Spending Trend" analysis graphically reflects
enough evidence to warrant this conclusion. Despite certain
anomalies, there are budget total and categorical outlay
similarities.
2. The difference in distribution of funds only reflects the nature of
each service organization. While each service has its own priori-
ties, such as MP in the Army, most of the graphs (Figures 5.1-
5.5) reflect the same peaks and valleys for each of the categories.
By looking at the 30-year aggregate picture, the categories all
appear similar. The actual dollar amounts for each of the cate-
gories differs with each service, but it seems that the "ups and
downs" are fairly consistent, regardless of service.
3. Although Anderson established that trends exist in DOD spend-
ing by category based on the availability of funds, the DOD sum is
the result of varied parts. By this, I mean that DOD totals are
allocated by Congress to the DOD as a government agency. Each
of the service departments receives its budget share via DOD and
spends according to its own needs. It does not follow that
DOA's, DOAF's. or DON'S individual spending will directly reflect
the DOD total. It must be noted that the budget process for DOD
often involves line item scrutiny at the congressional level,
which in turn is reflected at the service level. There is still
budgetary discretion in the services at both the planning and
budget execution levels. Service level historical outlay data
reflects this prioritization.
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Anderson's model is valid, but only for an individual organization
such as DOD. The grouping of years by availability of DOD funds does
not necessarily reflect the availability of funds allocated to the
individual services. The fact that Benson's thesis shows a similarity
between DOD and DON is probably due to coincidence, or the fact that
DON is most like the DOD average.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This thesis and those of Anderson, Benson, and Shockley attempt
to explain and illustrate trends in defense budgeting. Chapters 111, FV,
and V address the facts of the service budgets. Certain trends were
evident in individual services, depending on how one manipulates the
data. Complete explanations concerning the reason for these trends
will require further research. As a result, I propose the following
areas for future study:
1. Is the defense budget submitted as an aggregate by which the
individual services combine their priorities to ensure success?
If this is true, then why do certain inter-service redundancies
still exist, as in Research and Development?
2. How do "shocking" influences external to the U.S. force
budgeters to react via expenditure priorities, especially in
peacetime?
3. Do arbitrary budget ceilings exist, and if so, do the services
request more than necessary to facilitate receiving the maximum
after cuts?
4. Are programs that are multi-year in nature more susceptible to
cuts because they are long-range and hence out of the sight of
the budgeter and the public?
5. Do the services' budget requests reflect a desire to uphold
national security or rather just to sustain parochial priorities that
exist within each service?
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APPENDIX A
ARMY OUTLAYS IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLARS
(In Millions)
GNP
FY DEFLATOR TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 60.84 16.257 6,974 4,343 4,319 621
1956 62.79 13,777 6,297 4,298 2,523 659
1957 64.93 13,359 5.778 4.443 2,468 670
1958 66.04 13,414 5,695 4,656 2,342 721
1959 67.60 13,241 5,322 4,715 2,406 798
1960 68.70 13,155 5.290 4,503 2,336 1.026
1961 69.33 13,366 5,143 4.678 1,991 1,554
1962 70.61 14,828 5,399 5,299 2.310 1.820
1963 71.67 15.345 5.214 4,766 3,578 1.787
1964 72.77 15,741 5,723 4,998 3,181 1,839
1965 74.36 15,192 6,316 4,696 2.372 1.808
1966 76.76 18,039 6,826 5,894 3.479 1,840
1967 79.06 25,348 8.801 8,927 5.553 2,067
1968 82.54 28,137 9,716 9.607 7,077 1.737
1969 86.79 28,112 10,060 9,252 7,048 1.752
1970 91.45 25,985 10.193 8,278 5,693 1,821
1971 96.01 22,923 9.331 7.420 4,538 1,634
1972 100.00 21,351 8.498 7.180 3,894 1,779
1973 105.75 18.160 7.556 6.167 2,629 1.808
1974 115.08 17.087 7,085 5.680 2,419 1,903
1975 125.79 15.925 6,850 5,514 1,999 1,562
1976 132.34 14.557 6,650 5,492 1,023 1.392
1977 140.05 15.568 6.544 5,675 1,872 1,477
1978 150.42 16.057 6.460 5.897 2,143 1,557
1979 163.42 16.300 6,228 5.866 2,732 1.474
1980 178.42 16,985 6,221 6,208 3,039 1,517
1981 195.60 17,865 6,566 6.280 3,507 1.512
1982 207.38 19,915 7.227 7,087 4,044 1.557
1983 215.34 21,857 7,343 7,502 5,313 1.699
1984 223.38 22,891 7.409 7,701 6,074 1,707
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1956 8,651 3,954 2,699 1.584 414
1957 8,674 3,752 2,885 1.602 435
1958 8,859 3,761 3,075 1.547 476
1959 8.951 3,598 3.187 1.627 539
1960 9,037 3,634 3,093 1.605 705
1961 9,266 3,566 3,243 1.380 1.077
1962 10,470 3,812 3,742 1.631 1.285
1963 10.998 3.737 3.417 2,564 1,280
1964 11,455 4.165 3,637 2,315 1,338
1965 11,297 4.697 3,492 1.764 1,344
1966 13,846 5.239 4.524 2,671 1,412
1967 20,040 6.958 7,058 4,390 1,634
1968 23,224 8.019 7,930 5,841 1.434
1969 24,399 8.731 8,030 6,117 1.521
1970 23,762 9.321 7,570 5,206 1.665
1971 22.009 8.959 7,124 4,357 1,569
1972 21.351 8.498 7.180 3,894 1,779
1973 19.206 7.991 6,522 2.781 1,912
1974 19.663 8.153 6,536 2.784 2,190
1975 20.031 8.616 6,936 2.515 1,964
1976 19.264 8.801 7,268 1.353 1,842
1977 21.804 9.165 7,948 2.622 2,069
1978 24.153 9.717 8.870 3.224 2,342
1979 26.639 10.178 9.587 4.465 2,409
1980 30.307 11.100 11.077 5.423 2.707
1981 34.944 12.843 12.283 6.860 2.958
1982 41.302 14.988 14.698 8.386 3.230
1983 47.066 15.813 16.154 11.441 3.658
1984 51.134 16.551 17.203 13.568 3.812
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APPENDIX C
ARMY ESTIMATES IN CURRENT YEAR DOLLARS
(In Millions)
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT«&E
1955 11,582 4.135 3.442 3.650 355
1956 9.303 3.620 2.987 2.316 380
1957 8.400 3.700 3.030 1.300 370
1958 8.813 3.695 3.308 1.400 410
1959 8.437 3.684 2.992 1.301 460
1960 8.886 3.706 3.062 1.209 909
1961 8.961 3.808 3.134 1.211 808
1962 8,599 3.642 3.196 742 1,019
1963 11.147 3,856 3.456 2.555 1.280
1964 12.162 4.095 3.395 3,202 1.470
1965 11.113 4.474 3.463 1,779 1.397
1966 11.524 4,656 3,613 1,880 1.375
1967 15,867 6,492 4,720 3,220 1.435
1968 21.856 8,040 6,856 5,370 1.590
1969 23.894 8.343 8,193 5,708 1.650
1970 24,121 8.745 7,586 6,120 1.670
1971 20.670 8.209 6,425 4,372 1.664
1972 19.634 7.432 6,741 3,683 1.778
1973 18.482 7.783 6,678 2,096 1.925
1974 18.383 7.627 6,516 2,323 1.917
1975 19,653 8.312 6,957 2,439 1.945
1976 20.891 8,722 7,385 2,749 2.035
1977 22.498 8,954 8,242 3,015 2.287
1978 24.505 9,246 8,585 4,204 2,470
1979 25.828 9,569 9,376 4,308 2.575
1980 27.455 10,172 10,043 4,463 2.777
1981 32.451 11,483 11.905 6,097 2.966
1982 39.966 13.636 14.874 7,988 3.468
1983 48.861 15,515 17.297 12.010 4.039
1984 53.473 16,543 17.900 14,666 4.364
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APPENDIX D
ARMY OUTLAYS MINUS ESTIMATES IN CURRENT YEAR DOLLARS
(In Millions)
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 -1.691 108 -800 -1,022 23
1956 -652 334 -288 -732 34
1957 274 52 -145 302 65
1958 46 66 -233 147 66
1959 514 -86 195 326 79
1960 151 -72 31 396 -204
1961 305 -242 109 169 269
1962 1.870 170 545 889 266
1963 -193 -119 -39 -36 1
1964 -847 -70 242 -887 -132
1965 184 223 29 -15 -53
1966 2.322 583 911 791 37
1967 4,173 466 2.338 1.170 199
1968 1.368 -20 1,073 471 -156
1969 505 388 -163 409 -129
1970 -357 577 -15 -914 -5
1971 1.340 750 699 -14 -95
1972 3,622 1,066 439 2.116 1
1973 725 208 -156 685 -12
1974 1.280 526 20 461 273
1975 377 304 -22 76 19
1976 -1,627 79 -117 -1.396 -193
1977 -693 212 -294 -393 -218
1978 -353 471 284 -980 -128
1979 811 609 211 157 -166
1980 2,851 928 1,033 960 -70
1981 2,494 1.361 378 763 -8
1982 1,337 1,352 -176 399 -238
1983 -1,796 298 -1.143 -570 -381
1984 -2,338 8 -696 -1.098 -552
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APPENDIX E
AIR FORCE OUTLAYS IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLARS
(In Millions)
GNP
FY DEFLATOR TOTAL MP O&M PROG RDT&E
1955 60.84 25.150 5,793 5.433 13,191 733
1956 62.79 24,430 6.067 5,816 11,556 991
1957 64.93 26,030 5.781 6,291 12,836 1,122
1958 66.04 26,145 5.852 5.729 13,514 1.050
1959 67.60 26,132 5.951 6.205 12.773 1.203
1960 68.70 26.021 5.688 5.992 12,755 1,586
1961 69.33 29,407 5,737 6,166 15,101 2,403
1962 70.61 27,831 5.896 6,237 12,800 2,898
1963 71.67 27.199 5.651 6,058 10,887 4,603
1964 72.77 27,382 6,252 6.453 9,563 5.114
1965 74.36 23,364 6.191 6,084 6,859 4.230
1966 76.76 25,050 6.438 6,415 8,356 3,841
1967 79.06 27,997 6,754 6.918 10,241 4.084
1968 82.54 30,130 6.927 7,201 11,398 4.604
1969 86.79 29,482 7.024 7.849 10,708 3.901
1970 91.45 26.799 7,162 7,281 9,144 3,212
1971 96.01 23,988 6,985 6,650 7,427 2.926
1972 100.00 23.142 7.138 6,751 6.048 3.205
1973 105.75 21,805 6,955 6.189 5,482 3.179
1974 115.08 19.891 6.503 5.910 4,663 2.815
1975 125.79 19,124 6.055 6,154 4,285 2.630
1976 132.34 18,946 5.622 5.973 4,829 2.522
1977 140.05 18.816 5.302 5,988 4,942 2.584
1978 150.42 18.331 5,120 5,924 4,876 2.411
1979 163.42 18.743 4,947 5.850 5.450 2.496
1980 178.42 20,738 4,885 6.931 6.110 2.812
1981 195.60 22,617 5,167 7,438 6.770 3.242
1982 207.38 25.116 5,676 7,795 7.887 3.758
1983 215.34 27.367 5.816 8,052 9.235 4.264
1984 223.38 28.887 5.842 7,871 10.539 4.635
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APPENDIX F
AIR FORCE OUTLAYS IN CURRENT DOLLARS
(In Millions)
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 15,302 3.525 3,305 8,026 446
1956 15.341 3.810 3,652 7.256 623
1957 16.902 3.754 4,085 8.334 729
1958 17.266 3.864 3,783 8.925 694
1959 17,666 4.023 4.195 8,635 813
1960 17,876 3.908 4.116 8.763 1.089
1961 20.407 3,997 4.275 10.469 1.666
1962 19.651 4,163 4.404 9.038 2,046
1963 19,494 4.050 4.342 7.803 3,299
1964 19,927 4.550 4,696 6.959 3,722
1965 17.375 4.604 4.524 5.101 3,146
1966 19.227 4.941 4.924 6.414 2.948
1967 22.134 5.339 5.470 8.096 3.229
1968 24,870 5,718 5.944 9.408 3.800
1969 25,588 6,096 6.812 9.294 3,386
1970 24,508 6,550 6.659 8.362 2.937
1971 23,032 6.707 6.385 7.131 2.809
1972 23,142 7.138 6.751 6.048 3.205
1973 23.060 7.355 6,545 5.798 3.362
1974 22,892 7,484 6.801 5.367 3.240
1975 24,057 7.617 7.742 5.390 3.308
1976 25.074 7.441 7.905 6.390 3.338
1977 26.351 7.425 8.386 6.922 3.618
1978 27.574 7.702 8.911 7.335 3.626
1979 30.631 8,085 9.560 8.906 4.080
1980 37.001 8,716 12.366 10.902 5.017
1981 44.239 10.107 14.549 13.242 6.341
1982 52,088 11,772 16.166 16.356 7.794
1983 58.931 12,524 17.339 19.886 9.182
1984 64.528 13,051 17.583 23.541 10.353
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1956 14,403 3,338 3,450 7,075 540
1957 15.275 3,758 3,800 7.107 610
1958 15,903 3,850 4,135 7.248 670
1959 16,623 3,789 4,068 8.046 720
1960 17,421 4,012 4,174 8.224 1.011
1961 19,318 4,051 4,192 9,997 1.078
1962 19.152 4,054 4,200 9,764 1,134
1963 19,054 4.179 4,357 7,478 3,040
1964 18,897 4.203 4.385 6,687 3,622
1965 18,454 4.448 4.606 6.195 3.205
1966 17,854 4.549 4.600 5.565 3.140
1967 19,081 4.986 4,770 6.385 2.940
1968 23,156 5.741 5.400 8.735 3.280
1969 25,312 5,848 6.481 9,483 3.500
1970 25.097 6.004 6.680 8.937 3.476
1971 22,686 6.161 6.203 7.254 3.068
1972 22.106 6,263 6.201 6.695 2.947
1973 21,889 6.979 6.104 5.775 3.031
1974 22,705 7,028 6,646 5.934 3.097
1975 24,462 7.557 7.386 6.108 3,411
1976 25,343 7,493 8,081 6.029 3.740
1977 26,430 7,216 8,352 7.428 3.434
1978 29,316 7.352 8,870 8.965 4.129
1979 30.663 7.674 9,663 9.162 4.164
1980 32.080 8.026 10,126 9.316 4.612
1981 37,952 8,862 12,195 10,876 6.019
1982 50.186 10.550 16.789 14.912 7,935
1983 61.751 12,304 17,955 21.314 10.178
1984 71,443 13,068 19,256 26,862 12,257
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APPENDIX H
AIR FORCE OUTLAYS MINUS ESTIMATES
IN CURRENT YEAR DOLLARS
(In Millions)
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 372 200 -95 251 16
1956 938 472 202 181 83
1957 1.627 -4 285 1.227 119
1958 1,363 14 -352 1.677 24
1959 1.043 234 127 589 93
1960 456 -104 -57 539 78
1961 1.217 74 83 472 588
1962 501 109 204 -724 912
1963 440 -129 -15 325 259
1964 1.030 347 311 272 100
1965 -1.080 155 -82 -1094 -59
1966 1.374 393 324 849 -192
1967 3.053 353 700 1.711 289
1968 1,509 -228 544 673 520
1969 275 248 330 -189 -114
1970 -590 545 -21 -575 -539
1971 347 546 182 -123 -258
1972 1.036 875 550 -647 258
1973 1,171 376 441 23 331
1974 187 456 155 -567 143
1975 -405 60 356 -718 -103
1976 -269 -53 -175 361 -402
1977 -78 209 35 -506 184
1978 -1.742 350 41 -1.630 -503
1979 -32 411 -103 -256 -84
1980 4.921 690 2.240 1.586 405
1981 6.288 1.245 2.354 2.367 322
1982 1.902 1.222 -623 1.444 -141
1983 -2.820 220 -616 -1.428 -996
1984 -6.916 -17 -1.674 -3.321 -1.904
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APPENDIX I
NAVY OUTLAYS IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLARS
(In Millions)
GNP
FY DEFLATOR TOTAL MP O&M PROG RDT&E
1955 60.84 15.723 5,039 4.834 5.102 748
1956 62.79 15,309 5,026 4.010 5.558 715
1957 69.93 14,410 4,552 3,950 5,161 747
1958 66.04 16,678 4,829 4,076 6,837 936
1959 67.60 17,479 4,852 4,102 7,345 1,180
1960 68.70 15,389 4,696 4,017 5,560 1,116
1961 69.33 18,688 4,645 4,002 8.070 1,971
1962 70.61 18,396 4.700 4,346 7,510 1,840
1963 71.67 19,747 4,798 4,189 8,787 1,973
1964 72.77 19,957 5,267 4,219 8,303 2.168
1965 74.36 18,314 5,407 4,533 6.634 1,740
1966 76.76 19,994 6,045 5,293 6,823 1,833
1967 79.06 23,480 6,618 6,395 8,202 2,265
1968 82.54 25,293 6,931 6,252 9,683 2,427
1969 86.79 25.886 7.079 6.630 9,820 2,357
1970 91.45 24,332 7.295 6.071 8,687 2,279
1971 96.01 22,502 6.673 5.721 7,603 2,505
1972 100.00 21,999 6.748 5.689 7,135 2,427
1973 105.75 21,100 6.803 5.378 6,646 2.273
1974 115.08 20,419 6,376 5.658 6,106 2,279
1975 125.79 21,467 6,267 6.395 6,405 2,402
1976 132.34 21,051 5,969 6.872 5,781 2,429
1977 140.05 21,451 5,842 7.065 6,058 2,486
1978 150.42 21.922 5,775 7.490 6,114 2,543
1979 163.42 22.667 5,579 7,528 7,219 2,341
1980 178.42 23.642 5,514 8.726 6,947 2,455
1981 195.60 25.530 6,110 9,416 7,559 2,445
1982 207.38 27.969 6,579 10,113 8,750 2,527
1983 215.34 30.345 6,981 10,522 10,124 2,718
1984 223.38 31.269 7,032 10.515 10,740 2,982
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APPENDIX J
NAVY OUTLAYS IN CURRENT YEAR DOLLARS
(In Millions)
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 9.566 3.066 2,941 3,104 455
1956 9,611 3.156 2.518 3,488 449
1957 10,078 3,184 2.762 3,609 523
1958 11,014 3.189 2,692 4.515 618
1959 11.816 3.280 2,773 4.965 798
1960 10.573 3.226 2.760 3,820 767
1961 12.984 3.211 2,834 5.715 1.224
1962 12.990 3.319 3,069 5.303 1.299
1963 14.153 3.439 3.002 6.298 1,414
1964 14.523 3,833 3.070 6.042 1,578
1965 13.619 4.021 3.371 4.933 1,294
1966 15.347 4.640 4.063 5.237 1.407
1967 18.564 5.232 5.056 6.485 1,791
1968 20.876 5.721 5.160 7.992 2.003
1969 22.467 6.144 5,754 8.523 2.046
1970 22.252 6.671 5.552 7.945 2.084
1971 21.605 6.407 5,493 7.300 2.405
1972 21.999 6.748 5,689 7.135 2.427
1973 22.313 7.194 5,687 7.028 2,404
1974 23.498 7.337 6,511 7.027 2,623
1975 27.005 7.883 8,044 8,057 3.021
1976 27.858 7.899 9,094 7,650 3.215
1977 30.042 8.182 9,895 8,484 3.481
1978 32.975 8.687 11,266 9,197 3.825
1979 37.042 9.117 12,302 11,797 3.826
1980 42.182 9.838 15.569 12.394 4.381
1981 49.937 11.951 18.418 14.785 4.783
1982 58.002 13.644 20.973 18.145 5.240
1983 65.346 15.032 22,659 21.801 5.854
1984 69.849 15.709 23,488 23.990 6.662
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1956 9.497 2.911 2.395 3,757 434
1957 9,359 3.145 2.448 3,316 450
1958 9.944 3.219 2.730 3,495 500
1959 10.284 3.086 2.670 3,928 600
1960 11,441 3.263 2,752 4,504 922
1961 11.532 3.296 2,775 4,435 1.026
1962 11.947 3.358 2,768 4.572 1.249
1963 13.736 3.520 3,185 5.651 1.380
1964 15,044 3.553 3.142 6.849 1.500
1965 14,607 3.905 3.295 5.949 1.458
1966 14.560 4.041 3.409 5.715 1.395
1967 16,851 4.821 4.140 6.325 1.565
1968 19,968 5.591 5,060 7.477 1.840
1969 22.161 5.914 5.913 8,204 2,130
1970 22,503 6.246 5.789 8.318 2.150
1971 20.547 6.066 5.212 7.104 2.165
1972 20.892 5.829 5.306 7.497 2.260
1973 22.123 6.796 5.461 7.423 2.443
1974 23.539 7.062 5.951 7.967 2,559
1975 25.818 7.741 7,360 7.714 3,003
1976 27.604 7.882 8,765 7.708 3.249
1977 31.605 8.177 9,703 9.718 4.007
1978 34.191 8.396 11,370 10,433 3.992
1979 36.019 8.638 12,619 10,578 4.184
1980 38.160 9.149 13.155 11.441 4.415
1981 44.015 10.031 16.099 13.232 4.653
1982 55,170 12.392 20.333 16.872 5.573
1983 64,717 14.528 23.185 21.057 5.947
1984 73,274 15.596 24,618 25.921 7.139
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APPENDIX L
DOD BUDGET DATA IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLARS
(In Millions)
GNP
FY DEFLATOR DOD MP Q&M PROG RDT&E
1955 60.84 68,787 17.855 17.481 24,984 1,389
1956 62.79 54,149 16.434 14.498 19.479 2,150
1957 64.93 54,747 16.830 14.358 17,978 2,202
1958 66.04 57,541 17,144 15.333 23,346 2,392
1959 67.60 58,845 16,910 15.651 20,530 2,655
1960 68.70 59.600 16,331 15.014 20,287 4,137
1961 69.33 61.654 16,374 15.025 19,975 4.505
1962 70.61 63.249 16.236 15.066 20.426 5.577
1963 71.67 67.392 17,117 15.532 22,015 7.953
1964 72.77 70.084 16,751 15.432 22,437 9,015
1965 74.36 68,854 17.637 15.480 19,816 8,150
1966 76.76 62,402 17.314 15.225 17.170 7,699
1967 79.06 72,287 20.743 17.948 20.149 7.513
1968 82.54 87.594 23.973 21.834 26.150 8,129
1969 86.79 88,496 23.626 24.354 26.956 8,388
1970 91.45 85.808 23,449 22.650 25.560 7,978
1971 96.01 74,149 21.780 19.220 19.507 7,183
1972 100.00 74.975 20.105 18.944 17.875 6,985
1973 105.75 71.776 21.870 18.111 15.157 6,996
1974 115.08 67.953 19.552 17.520 14.274 6,581
1975 125.79 67,255 19,420 18.308 12.949 6,653
1976 132.34 67,856 18,891 19.371 12.404 6,819
1977 140.05 71.090 18.030 19.854 14,396 6,946
1978 150.42 72.811 17.288 20,225 15,700 7,042
1979 163.42 70.493 16.440 20,422 14.690 6,684
1980 178.42 68.771 15.944 19,675 14,150 6,616
1981 195.60 72.955 16,210 21.608 15.443 6,973
1982 207.38 88,919 18.459 26.339 19.180 8.186
1983 215.34 100,260 20,676 27.804 25.259 9,363
1984 223.38 106,813 21,343 28.969 30.222 10.637
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